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Abstract Academic and policy interest in civil society participation in the European
Union’s trade policy has been growing since the late 1990s. We analyse civil society’s
engagement with the Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs)—consultation mechanisms
established by the European Commission at the implementation stage of its free trade
agreements. While the Commission’s formal rationale for the DAGs is partnership with civil
society, in fact this relationship involves a marked power and resistance dynamic. We focus
on civil society’s agency and resistance, develop a conceptual framework laying out different
possible types of resistance, and empirically demonstrate the wealth of both overt and subtle
resistance practices employed by DAG members. Most of this resistance is (moderately)
comprehensive and directed against the DAGs’ rationalities and technologies. While showing
that DAGs are deeply contested, our study also provides a nuanced analysis of resistance
with particular attention for divisions between business and non-business members.
Introduction
Civil society participation in the European Union’s (EU) trade policy has been
an increasingly hot topic since the late 1990s, and stakeholders, many of them
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dissatisfied with the way in which the EU has been conducting its trade policy,
have been calling for greater transparency and new engagement opportunities.
The European Commission, with competence in trade policy, has tried to chan-
nel these demands for participation and policy change into a myriad of institu-
tionalized consultation formats open to non-governmental stakeholders (D€ur
and De Bievre 2007; Hannah 2016; Gheyle and De Ville 2017). Here, we will spe-
cifically focus on the Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs)—civil society groups
that have been established both in the EU and its partner countries since 2010.
DAGs monitor trading partners’ compliance with the commitments made in the
‘trade and sustainable development’ (TSD) chapters included in its free trade
agreements (FTAs) starting with the EU-Korea FTA which was signed in 2010.
The DAGs have been chosen because they constitute relatively institutionalized
mechanisms with a rather stable membership, have existed for several years and
meet regularly. Moreover, reform of the DAGs over the last years has stayed on
both the Commission’s and civil society’s agenda, which justifies greater atten-
tion to how their participants engage with these mechanisms.
Participation of civil society and other stakeholders in EU trade policy has
been the subject of numerous recent books and articles (for example Hocking
2004; Young and Peterson 2006; Hannah 2016; Khorana and Garcia 2018;
Marceddu 2018). A small part of this literature is rather optimistic about the
possibilities for dialogue that are offered through the DAGs, seeing them as
potentially impactful (Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Prevost and Alexovicova
2019). However, most authors are pessimistic and point to shortcomings. Some
argue that the EU uses dialogue with stakeholders in order to legitimize its
policies and counterbalance opposition, sometimes without any real intent to
take their suggestions on board (Van Den Hoven 2002; D€ur 2008; Jarman 2008;
Harrison et al 2019). The tension between business and non-business stake-
holders is a pervasive theme, and business is usually believed to have more
influence over the EU’s trade policy than non-business actors (Grugel 2004;
D€ur and De Bievre 2007; D€ur 2008; Hocking and Smith 2011; Wetzel 2011;
Altintzis 2013; Orbie et al 2016; Eckhardt 2018; Ford 2018; for a different per-
spective see Gerlach 2006). Studies also emphasize the DAGs’ low impact on
compliance with sustainable development commitments (D€ur and De Bievre
2007; Hannah 2016; Velut 2016; Harrison et al 2019). This is often explained by
restrictive legal provisions and in particular weak dispute resolution and
enforcement mechanisms under the TSD chapters (Campling et al 2016;
Harrison et al 2019; Kube 2019). Stakeholders mostly direct their criticism at
the institutional weaknesses (Altintzis 2013; Ebert 2016; Marx et al 2016; Orbie
et al 2017; Harrison et al 2019). In addition, academics have pointed to the
absence of clear linkages between civil society input and policy-making (Velut
2016; Harrison et al 2019), to EU discourses delimiting possibilities for civil
society to advocate paradigmatic changes which may foster cooptation
(Hannah 2016; Orbie et al 2016; Ford 2018; Lawrence 2018; Holden 2019), and
to overall structural limitations on the influence of certain interest groups
within the DAGs (Smith et al 2018).
What all these accounts have in common, however, is their emphasis on
the structural dimension of the DAGs. Although studies often partly rely on
stakeholders’ opinions, these are embedded in analyses of the wider institu-
tional (such as the DAGs’ rules of procedure, representativeness,
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accountability mechanisms, available resources) and ideational (such as the
free trade philosophy, reliance on deliberative principles, vagueness of the
sustainability concept) context. In other words, the predominant interest has
centred on factors that enable or (mostly) constrain the relevance and func-
tioning of DAGs.
Without denying the key importance of these structural factors, in this art-
icle we aim to shed light on the other and often neglected side of the coin by
proposing an agency-centred approach that primarily focuses on stakeholders’
response to the ways in which the DAGs are run by the Commission. We
argue that mere participation in a DAG does not necessarily mean being fully
content with the participation opportunities and rules that it provides. Instead
of focussing on compliance (or cooptation), as some studies have done (Orbie
et al 2016; Ford 2018; Lawrence 2018), we explore how the DAG members
resist specific mechanisms put in place by the Commission, and what alterna-
tives they advocate. It is important to note that here, we do not consider sub-
stantive suggestions on trade and sustainable development in either the EU or
the partner countries made by DAG members; rather, we focus on their resist-
ance to the ways in which they are supposed to engage with the EU, highlight-
ing the ways in which DAG members challenge and modify existing
participation opportunities to better suit their needs. This could also be called
‘meta-participation’ or participation on participation (Soler Maso and Novella
Camara 2015; Arias et al 2016), instead of participation on specific TSD issues;
yet we prefer the term resistance as more fit for going beyond the above-men-
tioned structural approaches.
Theoretically, we aim to grasp this agency and resistance dimension by
developing an original conceptual framework that combines insights from
governmentality studies that bring attention to less visible power that may be
hiding behind the notion of ‘partnership’ (McKee 2009; Kurki 2011; Malmvig
2014), with resistance literature including the notion of ‘infrapolitics’ (Scott
2012). Beyond clear and visible acts, there is a diverse arsenal of more or less
subtle forms of resistance that DAG participants can employ and that have
remained under the radar of existing research. Specifically, we discern six
types of resistance. These involve not only the obvious ‘rejection’ but also
more subtle variants such as subversion and acquiescence. Furthermore, we
discern three targets of resistance: rationality, technology and subjectivity. By
doing so, we capitalize on post-Foucauldian literature which allows us to dis-
tinguish these different aspects of governmentality and contribute to the
existing analysis by further refining the ways in which we can disaggre-
gate resistance.
Empirically, this framework is applied to the activities of EU DAG mem-
bers between 2017 and 2019 and examines how they resist the Commission’s
way of managing the DAGs and the limited participation opportunities it
offers. The analysis covers the DAGs established under the EU’s agreements
with Canada, South Korea, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, the multilateral agree-
ment with Central America, the multilateral agreement with Colombia, Peru
and Ecuador, as well as the similar Consultative Committee established under
the EU-CARIFORUM agreement. In terms of methods, we use a qualitative
approach that relies on three types of data. First, we conducted 11 confidential
semi-structured interviews with ten current DAG members and one ex-
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member (Brussels, December 2018 – February 2019)1. Second, we use notes
from 12 DAG meetings and other meetings with DAG members dating from
November 2017 until March 2019. Third, we analyse seven written comments
on the European Commission’s 2017 non-paper discussing possible changes in
the TSD chapters (Commission Services 2017) submitted by organizations rep-
resented in the DAGs (‘Feedback’ 2018). (While a detailed analysis of non-
members of the DAGs would be potentially illuminating, it lies beyond the
scope of this article.) Although the popular opinion that EU’s trade policy is
heavily influenced by business interests might lead us to assume that they
would not contest the Commission’s way of managing the DAGs, we also
identify resistance among business representatives and proceed to compare
them with non-business representatives. In fact, types of resistance can be
encountered in every interview and written comment; we sourced approxi-
mately 150 examples of resistance in total and structured them in a separate
Excel database, which allows us to gain a first-hand insight into different DAG
members’ ways of dealing with the mechanisms. Admittedly, our data may be
incomplete or biased because of the nature of subtle resistance, which is more
difficult to identify.
The article is structured as follows. First, we offer a brief overview of the
DAGs as participation mechanisms. Second, we construct a conceptual frame-
work describing the diverse possibilities for the subjects to resist (governmen-
tal) power. Subsequently, we apply this framework to a discussion of the
diverse ways in which DAG members resist the EU’s governmentality. We
conclude by reflecting on the main tendencies uncovered by the research and
some implications for the future of the consultation mechanisms.
The DAGs as a consultative forum
Before proceeding with the conceptual and empirical analysis, this background
section describes the set-up of the DAGs. The DAGs were introduced in each
of the ‘new generation’ EU free trade agreements. They are a key part of the
European Commission’s promise to support sustainable development in the
framework of its free trade agreements (European Commission 2015;
Commission Services 2018). There is an EU DAG and a partner country DAG
for each trade agreement. Typically, at least on the EU side, the DAGs
‘comprise independent representative organisations of civil society in a bal-
anced representation of economic, social, and environmental stakeholders’ (see
for example ‘Association Agreement’ 2014), sometimes with the participation
of other non-governmental organizations.
The Commission’s rationale is that free trade and sustainable development
can be reconciled (Young and Peterson 2013; European Commission 2015;
Garcia and Masselot 2015; Lawrence 2018), even though in practice this has
proven deeply problematic due to the overly heavy focus on trade liberaliza-
tion (D€ur 2008; Siles-Br€ugge 2014; Ulmer 2015; Hannah 2016; Orbie et al 2016).
The initial intentions for the creation of DAGs were not to empower civil
1 The interviews are coded as follows: B1, B2, B3, B5, B6, B7, B8, B11 are non-business
representatives (trade unions as well as other civil society organizations), B4, B9, B10 [ex-member]
are business representatives. Hereafter we refer to them by code.
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society, but rather to merely promote learning at the intergovernmental and
civil society level. This would not involve sanctions or other punitive measures
(Postnikov and Bastiaens 2014; Leeg 2018; Prevost and Alexovicova 2019).
According to Harrison et al (2019, 267), both EU and partner country officials
‘did not see the TSD chapters as their primary responsibility’, positioning the
civil society mechanisms as primary (and autonomous) drivers of sustainability
instead.
The DAGs usually meet 1–3 times a year and provide recommendations on
implementation of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters of the
agreements, with an additional very weak role in enforcement (see
‘Association Agreement’ 2014; Commission Services 2017; 2018). As part of
their monitoring duties, they produce joint documents with the partner coun-
try as well as, in some cases, own reports and letters, yet there are no formal
follow-up procedures to ensure parties’ accountability, so the actual impact of
the DAGs remains very limited (Campling et al 2016; Orbie et al 2016; Velut
2016; Harrison et al 2019; Kube 2019). The DAGs’ enforcement role sometimes
foresees consultation in dispute settlement procedures (Kube 2019), yet this is
rather irrelevant in practice, since until now, the Commission has been reluc-
tant to trigger this procedure. So far it has only happened once, in the case of
Korea in 2018, and even though the European DAG had requested intergov-
ernmental consultations twice, the Commission only acted after the European
Parliament adopted a resolution with the same request. Thus, the Korea case
seems to illustrate the limited powers of the DAGs.
The functioning of the European DAGs is heavily dependent on the
European Commission, which negotiates the treaty provisions on DAGs,
recruits most European DAG participants, is present at their meetings and
serves as a major source of information for many attendees, provides some
financial and technical support, and ultimately decides whether, and how, to
take their suggestions into account. The European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC) usually delegates three members to each DAG and serves
as the DAGs’ secretariat. In general, however, bureaucratic and political sup-
port and follow-up has been limited so far, even after additional funding was
assigned in 2018 (see Commission Services 2018). The main complaints identi-
fied in the literature to date include the low frequency of the meetings, opaque
selection mechanisms, little publicity, insufficient capacity of civil society,
issues with information sharing by the governmental bodies, and, as men-
tioned above, lack of accountability and impact in the absence of a strong
enforcement mechanism and a weak civil society role in dispute settlement
(Altintzis 2013; Ebert 2016; Marx et al 2016; Orbie et al 2016; Harrison et al
2019). After conceptualizing varieties of resistance in the next section, we will
turn to a more detailed analysis of stakeholders’ resistance to the current setup
of the DAGs, highlighting the concerns expressed by business and non-busi-
ness groups.
Conceptualizing varieties of resistance
In order to provide an agency-centred perspective, we build on previous stud-
ies that have elaborated the notion of ‘resistance’ and post-Foucauldian gov-
ernmentality scholarship. We construct an original conceptual framework that
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includes three dimensions: comprehensiveness of resistance, visibility of resist-
ance, and its targets. The typology advanced in this section can admittedly be
applied to resistance against diverse forms of power. Yet insights from govern-
mentality studies are relevant for our study in three ways: the idea that power
may be hidden behind ‘partnership’ relations, the emphasis on how power
almost inevitably generates resistance (relational view on power), and the dis-
tinction between three components of governmentality or ‘targets’
of resistance.
Through the prism of governmentality, the Commission’s interaction with
the DAGs can be interpreted as a productive, micro-level type of power, or
‘conduct of conduct’ which operates through ideas (Foucault 1980; McKee
2009; Joseph 2010; Kurki 2011; Merlingen 2011; Lilja and Vinthagen 2014;
Lawrence 2018). Power, according to this perspective, is not total and can only
be exercised over subjects who enjoy a certain degree of freedom (McKee 2009;
see also Baaz et al 2016; Derous and Roeck 2019). While governmentality schol-
ars tend to overlook agency, it is not per se irrelevant (Bevir 2016). In fact,
Bevir (2016) calls for ‘a more resolutely historicist and genealogical version of
governmentality’ that would decentre the analysis away from the structuralist
interpretation of power and towards analyses of how practices are constructed
by independent agents. He points out that the outcome is a ‘messy’ govern-
mentality, where subjects’ practices do not necessarily correspond to the policy
documents, and specifically invites to deconstruct the notion that modern gov-
ernance is uniformly ‘neoliberal’. This invites us to pay attention to agency
and resistance.
Like power, resistance is an essentially contested concept (Hollander and
Einwohner 2004; Baaz et al 2016; Johansson and Vinthagen 2016; Mumby et al
2017; Lilja and Vinthagen 2018). It does not necessarily involve a rejection of
power altogether; it may show ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that,
by these people, at this price’ (Foucault 1997, 72; see also McKee 2009; Kurki
Figure 1. Typology of resistance (authors’ framework).
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2011; Lilja and Vinthagen 2014; Malmvig 2014; Death 2016), but rather based
on different ideas. Resistance is structured by power (Malmvig 2014; Death
2016; Lilja and Vinthagen 2018; see also Piven and Cloward 2003; Hollander
and Einwohner 2004), and analysing resistance helps us to better understand
the logics of power (Baaz et al 2016).
In what follows, we develop a six-fold typology of resistance, pragmatically
using post-Foucauldian and resistance literature. The framework is structured
along two axes: visibility and comprehensiveness of resistance. The visibility (x-)
axis goes from subtle resistance, which does not manifest itself as a clear polit-
ical demand, to more overt forms which imply direct confrontation with the
power nexus. This relates to Scott’s (1989; 2012) work on ‘everyday forms of
resistance’ or ‘infrapolitics’, which are political in character, but take a more
banal form such as foot-dragging, false compliance, desertion, and even con-
sumer activism. It is aimed at de facto changes, in contrast to open resistance
which can mean riots, petitions, and protest voting, and purports to recognize
the changes de jure (Scott 1989; 2012; see also Velut 2012). We use the term
‘subtle’ as it denotes a broader spectrum of less-than-obvious resistance than
in Scott’s original focus on subordinate groups (cf. Scott 1989), and is in line
with terminology used by other authors (Malmvig 2014; Lilja et al 2017).
Comprehensiveness of resistance (y-axis) denotes the extent to which power
is being resisted, namely, if it is rejected in its totality, only partly, or solely on
specific points. Although this dimension has not been explicitly conceptualized
in the literature on resistance (for example Hollander and Einwohner 2004;
Johansson and Vinthagen 2016), several authors have implied that power
effects on individuals can be located on a continuum from more to less com-
prehensive, where ‘subjects … can accommodate, adapt, contest or resist top-
down endeavours to govern them’ (McKee 2009, 479; see also Benjaminsen
2014; Hall et al 2015; Killick 2019). Thus, the agent may only mount token
resistance; or negotiate and modify the power according to their preferences;
or resist power in its entirety.
Both axes represent a continuum of possible degrees, which allows us to
distinguish six ideal types of resistance as seen in Figure 1:
1. Acquiescence involves agents privately maintaining their own opinion
while aligning with power in practice. Thus, it is different from agreement,
which implies changing one’s opinions or maintaining identical ones (cf.
Sivaramakrishnan 2005). This limited form of resistance is still relevant,
since if circumstances change the agent may decide to act on their
independently held ideas.
2. Concession is similar to acquiescence in that the agent follows the practical
demands of power while maintaining a different opinion on specific issues.
However, it implies the agent overtly stating that they are adjusting against
their will.
3. Rearticulation has been used by Baaz et al (2016, 147) to denote a form of
subtle resistance whereby ‘subalterns involve the categories and
vocabularies of the dominating force or superior norm, precisely in order to
contest them’ (see also Lilja and Vinthagen 2014; 2018). Such resistance is
partial: it attempts to modify power but does not reject it altogether.
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4. Negotiation is similar in nature to rearticulation, with the distinction of
being overt; the agent openly voices their concerns and attempts to
negotiate accommodations (see Hollander and Einwohner 2004;
Benjaminsen 2014; as well as Lilja and Vinthagen 2018).
5. Subversion is sometimes taken to be synonymous with resistance (Baaz et al
2016), but here we use it as complete yet subtle rejection of a specific form of
power in favour of an alternative arrangement—for instance, foot-dragging
(Scott 1989) or circumvention. It relates to Scott’s quoting of Bishop
Trelawny on a ‘pestilent pernicious people … such as take the oaths to the
Government, but underhand … labour its subversion’ (Scott 1989, 33) and
Gel’man writing about subversive institutions in Russia (Gel’man 2012).
6. Rejection means that a specific form of power is overtly opposed in its
totality, in favour of an alternative arrangement (cf. Benjaminsen 2017).
Furthermore, we distinguish between three different empirical ‘components’
or ‘targets’ of governmentality which actors can resist: rationalities, technologies
and subjectivities (Lawrence 2018; see also Kurki 2011). The rationality of gov-
ernment is the ideational foundation underlying a certain policy, for instance,
the Commission’s belief that sustainable development can be promoted through
the EU’s free trade agreements in their current form. Different rationalities can
co-exist in time and space (Lawrence 2018). Technologies of governance are the
tangible ‘mechanisms’ and ‘techniques’ that are used towards the objects of gov-
ernance for the purpose of implementing a certain rationality (Foucault 2008)—
for instance, creation of a DAG uniting three groups of non-governmental stake-
holders and working on a voluntary basis. Subjectivities are the individual
properties, or identities, of social subjects which arise from a certain rationality
(Lawrence 2018), for instance, the Commission expecting civil society representa-
tives to be able to self-govern and reconcile internal conflicts (Foucault 2008;
Malmvig 2014; Derous and Roeck 2019). All three are conveyed through dis-
course as well as specific governing behaviours (Foucault 2007; McKee 2009;
Death 2010; Kurki 2011).
The resulting conceptual framework (Table 1) shows that the six ideal types
of resistance may be directed at various elements of governmentality. The
same agent can resist various elements of governmentality with varying visibil-
ity, and more or less comprehensively; for instance, they may acquiesce to a
specific rationality, but negotiate a technology linked to this rationality, and
outright reject a subjectivity ascribed to them.
This conceptual framework calls for a nuanced and context-based approach
to analysis that is open to different scenarios of resistance. This allows us to
identify weaker sides of a particular governance arrangement. In the next sec-
tion, we apply our framework to the empirical analysis of individual DAG
members’ resistance to the Commission’s governmentality regarding the DAGs.
Table 1. Conceptual framework: resistance and governmentality.
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Unpacking resistance
We now turn to the empirical manifestations of resistance shown by the EU’s
DAG members to the Commission’s ways of managing participation through the
DAGs. Systematically applying the conceptual framework (Table 1), we focus on
three main conceptual dimensions: visibility, comprehensiveness and targets of
resistance against the existing participation arrangements. In other words, we dis-
cuss how explicit the resistance is, how pronounced it is, and what the primary
objects of civil society’s dissatisfaction are. In doing so, we distinguish between
business and non-business stakeholders, as existing studies (supra) and our own
analysis show that differences in their opinions are significant, and because, as
stated above, we should not automatically assume that businesses are part of a
so-called ‘neoliberal’ governmentality and endorse the Commission’s approach.
Visibility: plethora of subtle resistances
In terms of visibility, we observe not only overt (most prevalent) but also subtle
resistance on the part of civil society against the ways in which the Commission
expects them to participate. While both business and non-business participants
engage in various forms of resistance, the latter make use of overt resistance
practices more often, possibly reflecting their traditional approach to advocacy
as well as the degree of their discontent with the Commission’s approach (cf.
D€ur and De Bievre 2007; Del Felice 2013). These mostly consist of preparing let-
ters, position papers and verbal criticism, which can take place within the DAG
or in public fora: examples include ‘continuously putting pressure on the next
Commission and next Parliament in order to achieve something good’ (B6),
demanding official recognition of joint EU and partner countries’ DAG-to-DAG
meetings during a meeting where the Commission is present (participant obser-
vation 2018), or several DAGs drafting a joint letter asking to improve the
organization of transnational meetings (B2; see also ‘Feedback’ 2018). Both busi-
ness and non-business actors engage in negotiations through coalition-building
within their respective DAGs as well as with members of other DAGs, but virtu-
ally always within their own subgroup. A prominent example of cooperation
among non-business representatives is the informal ‘DAGs for Change’ alliance
with participation of academics (who formally cannot be part of the DAGs),
trade unions and non-business NGOs (Royal Geographical Society (with IBG)
2019). Yet another, and much more radical, practice of overt resistance would be
to reject the DAGs altogether. While this analysis only concerns current mem-
bers, several interviewees revealed that a ‘DAG-xit’ may happen if there are no
improvements (for example B2). One business representative had decided not to
prolong their DAG membership due to a misfit in priorities (B10).
However, much more is happening in and around the DAGs than overt
advocacy. A subtle but powerful strategy that we classify as rearticulation is to
reshape the work of the DAGs. Both businesses and non-businesses who wish
to strengthen the groups do it, for instance, by inviting external experts to give
their arguments more credibility,2 pushing fellow DAG members to develop a
work plan and opinion papers in order to give the work of the group more
2 One co-author of this article presented a study at a DAG meeting in 2016.
Forging their path in the Brussels bubble? 9
substance (B2), or creating alternative subgroups within the DAG (B11). Others,
who are not so interested in the mechanisms or dislike the ways in which they
are managed (for example reliance on voluntary contributions) rearticulate their
membership by ‘dragging their feet’, for instance, not prioritizing preparation
for DAG meetings (B5) and avoiding less interesting ones (B4). Many DAG
members also rearticulate the guidelines of the Commission in a way that fits
their specific purposes, especially concerning their preferred way of balancing
trade and sustainable development.
A notable, and popular, strategy, which we classify as subversion, is mar-
ginalizing or circumventing the DAGs as the supposed key forum for discus-
sing trade and sustainable development. This seems to be more popular
among the larger, more influential and more internationalized organizations,
while smaller and less resourceful members tend to value the DAGs as giving
them a ‘window to the world’ and access to the Commission (B1; B3). While
such actions may seem unrelated, they are nonetheless tied to dissatisfaction
with the DAGs. As one non-business interviewee put it,
the DAGs actually come as an additional forum to present things and to work in, there is,
has been a life before the trade agreements and before the DAGs and there is a life after
and outside that … I mean someone who thinks that DAG is the place where it all
happens should not be there actually … This person is completely naïve. (B11)
Several non-business players are active in promoting sustainable trade in the
European Parliament, the Council, individual member states and the media,
because all of these are seen by them as more effective channels than the DAGs
(B11). Both business and non-business actors also use other, non-DAG channels
for interacting with the Commission: informal conversations on the margins of
DAG meetings (B3; B5), or separate meetings (B6). As one business representa-
tive commented, ‘the Commission listens, but usually on the bilateral basis’ (B4).
The 2017 complaint against the Peruvian government for violating its commit-
ments on labour and environmental issues under the TSD chapter (Plataforma
Europa Peru 2017) can also be described as an example of subtle resistance
against the powerlessness of the DAG. Since the DAG itself was not in a pos-
ition to lodge such a complaint, it was submitted independently by a DAG
member to the European Commission and later endorsed by the DAG (B2; B3;
B5; B7; B11), propelling the Commission to address the issues with their
Peruvian counterparts. As we see, subtle resistance is a rather popular strategy
for coping with the constraints imposed by the DAGs’ set-up.
Comprehensiveness: from medium to high
Regarding comprehensiveness, most observed practices of resistance are mid-
dle-range (rearticulation and negotiation) or far-reaching (subversion and rejec-
tion), meaning that the Commission’s way of organizing the DAGs is opposed
completely or to a significant extent. Both business and non-business actors
engage in such practices of resistance—however, the former have been particu-
larly active in resisting the technologies of the DAG whereas the latter have
more strongly resisted the rationality behind them.
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Rearticulation and negotiation, which are the two types of resistance demand-
ing partial changes, are very pronounced with regard to the specific technologies
used to govern the DAGs. Non-business stakeholders have been particularly
active in coming up with suggestions. Not avoiding any form of governance, but
rather engaging in productive resistance emphasizing ‘the will not to be governed
thusly’ (supra), is rather evident; as one non-business interviewee put it, ‘When
one enters the game, you must respect the rules or not play. If the rules are bad,
you have to try to change the rules’ (B3). Comprehensive resistance to the tech-
nologies behind the DAGs is relatively scarcer among this group although very
much present, perhaps because they have consistently advocated for greater civil
society engagement in decision-making on trade issues and prefer renegotiating
the terms of engagement rather than abandoning it altogether. Business, in the
meantime, shows sometimes partial and sometimes comprehensive resistance to
the Commission’s technologies, arguing that ‘it’s potentially an interesting tool
but it’s not delivering’ (B9). When it comes to the rationality behind the DAGs,
non-business actors seem to react more strongly: rejection or subversion is more
frequent than demanding piecemeal changes or accepting it with reservations.
Business, in turn, negotiates or rearticulates the Commission’s rationality slightly
more often than subverting or rejecting it outright.
Targets: rationalities and technologies
Both business and non-business actors actively contest and attempt to tweak
the rationality and technology behind the DAGs. The former seem to treat
both targets equally critically, while the latter heavily concentrate on the tech-
nologies, although, as mentioned above, they also have spoken strongly if less
frequently against the EU’s rationality. However, neither invest much effort in
contesting subjectivities ascribed to them by the Commission.
Business and non-business members resist the EU’s rationality from opposite
standpoints, putting the Commission in-between conflicting demands. This
resistance capitalizes on the ambiguities in the Commission’s approach, in par-
ticular its inconclusive formulation of the linkage between trade and sustainable
development. It picks preferred elements and discards less interesting ones and,
in doing so, produces alternative visions for the DAGs. First, the balance
between the ‘trade’ and ‘sustainable development’ components of TSD chapters
is hotly contested. Some business organizations tend to downplay the need for
discussing sustainability issues within the DAGs due to potential economic
repercussions, instead prioritizing their resolution in other cooperation formats
outside of trade agreements (B9). They do not deny the importance of sustain-
able development altogether but rather prefer to decouple trade and sustainable
development: ‘it’s written trade and sustainable development, so [in the DAG]
we want to discuss trade!’ (B9). Negative externalities are treated as an inevit-
able but not sufficient reason to halt trade (B4; B9), or sometimes denied (partici-
pant observation 2018). Other business members admit that improving
sustainability in partner countries is important for achieving a ‘level playing
field’ yet also insist that trade is in itself ‘an effective driver of sustainable devel-
opment’ (BUSINESSEUROPE 2017, in ‘Feedback’ 2018). Thus, business in gen-
eral actively opposes the possibilities of pre-ratification conditionality or of
sanctions in TSD chapters – the latter were at some point considered by the
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Commission (BUSINESSEUROPE 2017; Fooddrink Europe 2018, both in
‘Feedback’ 2018). It seems to be generally satisfied with Commission’s monitor-
ing-oriented approach which fits its own rationality better.
In turn, non-business interviewees prioritize sustainable development over
trade (B1; B3), correspondingly believing that DAGs should aim to prevent a ‘race
to the bottom’ in labour and other standards (B6): ‘Trade can be a great oppor-
tunity only if it creates quality jobs and boosts sustainable growth’ (ETUC 2017,
annex to ‘Feedback’ 2018). So far, the Commission’s implementation of TSD chap-
ters has not been particularly assertive, which has led many non-business organi-
zations to perceive it as biased towards business interests (B2; B3; B6; B7; B11).
They mention that while the TSD Unit of DG TRADE is interested in promoting
sustainability, this priority remains secondary to commerce in the general policy
of DG TRADE, which is also why it is difficult for the DAGs to have any impact
on sustainable development matters (B3; B11). Still, even the interviewees critical
of the EU’s FTAs do not go so far as to call for complete abolishment or renegoti-
ation of the trade deals, at least not in the DAG framework,3 which indicates
acceptance of the Commission’s trade policy on a very basic level.
Second, the Commission’s focus on promoting its values internationally,
which is an implicit task of the DAGs, is also contested on two different flanks.
Most businesses and, surprisingly, some trade unions believe that the EU should
be focussing on its own gain, especially ‘to ensure a level playing field’ (quote
from B1; also B6; BUSINESSEUROPE 2017, in ‘Feedback’ 2018); at the same
time, business has also stated that ‘The EU should not impose its views and ele-
vate itself to a position of superiority’ regarding partner countries, implying this
will harm trade (BUSINESSEUROPE 2017; also Fooddrink Europe 2018, both in
‘Feedback’ 2018; B9). On the opposite side of the continuum, multiple non-busi-
ness representatives argue that the Commission pays insufficient attention to sus-
tainability in the partner countries (B2; B3; B7; B11), for instance, twice rejecting
the requests by the EU DAG for Korea to initiate formal consultations related to
violations of labour rights (ETUC [n.d.] in ‘Feedback’ 2018; also B6).
The technologies behind the DAGs have been the main target of resistance
for non-business actors. Some examples of acquiescence/concession are visible
when grudgingly accepting cooperation with business organizations within the
DAGs (B2; B3; B11). In turn, the lack of accountability of the Commission to
the DAG and the ‘soft’ dialogue-based approach are often rejected altogether
(B2; B6; B11). However, generally the resistance is of the negotiation and, to a
lesser extent, rearticulation kind: civil society tries to reshape the DAGs for
their specific purposes, reacting to power in a productive way. A key demand
is to change the function of the DAGs from what is interpreted as mere
‘window-dressing’ (B11) to meaningful monitoring and advocacy (B6) and
ultimately to policy impact (B2). This implies more vertical dialogue, political
will on the side of policy-makers, substantially increased accountability of the
Commission and partner governments and, possibly, legal provisions for sanc-
tions if TSD provisions are violated (Eurogroup for Animals 2017; Client Earth
2017; ETUC [n.d.], all in ‘Feedback’ 2018; B6; B7; B11). Demands for improving
the functioning of the DAGs are also very popular, again with the aim to
3 One interviewee admitted that while they do not criticize the agreement in dialogue with
the Commission, they do maintain ‘a very tough discourse’ in other fora (B3).
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increase their clout: clearer objectives, more substantive discussions, a higher
degree of institutionalization, more meetings, better advance planning, more
administrative support, more funding, and greater support for transnational
dialogue with partner countries’ DAGs (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2018, in
‘Feedback’ 2018; B1; B2; B3; B5; B7; B8; participant observation 2018).
Business organizations resist the technologies behind the DAGs based on
their own preferences which centre around limiting the role of sustainability in
free trade agreements. The existence of DAGs is reluctantly tolerated, insofar as
sustainability remains purely voluntary for business; as one business interviewee
put it, ‘this is a policy which will not change, so we have to deal with this, so
we will continue to be part of these groups and watch what’s going on’ (B9).
Yet generally, businesses are very careful in their participation. Domestic
Advisory Groups considered to be less interesting (for instance, if trade volume
with the partner country is low) or specific meetings are ignored (B4), and prior-
ity issues are discussed directly with the Commission (B4; B9). At the same
time, several organizations have also supported stronger DAGs, as long as they
do not obtain increased powers in dispute settlement under the TSD chapters;
this probably relates to the preference for greater transparency in trade policy,
as well as monitoring needed to ensure the ‘level playing field’ (Fooddrink
Europe 2018, in ‘Feedback’ 2018; participant observation 2017–2018; B9).
Interestingly, subjectivities, or individual roles and behaviours ascribed by
the Commission to the DAG members, are by far the least contested aspect of
the EU’s governmentality both among business and non-business participants.
This can probably be explained by most DAG members having sometimes dec-
ades-long experience in interacting with the Commission and accepting the
EU’s expectations from civil society; in particular, our EESC interviewees have
shown virtually no resistance in this regard. Nonetheless, the ideas of cross-
sectoral collaboration, and civil society serving as a monitor and advocate for
sustainability, are not entirely uncontested. Firstly, some business as well as
non-business representatives are sceptical or unwilling to cooperate with repre-
sentatives of the opposite camp (B9; participant observation 2018). Some non-
business representatives explicitly doubt that business belongs in the DAGs: ‘I
don’t know under which pretext [business organizations] have the legitimacy
to monitor labour and environmental commitments which are rather the topics
of trade unions and NGOs’ (B2). Secondly, while the Commission expects
DAG members to act in a proactive yet constructive manner, this subjectivity
is not always shared. Some non-business organizations see themselves as
watchdogs who must ‘put pressure’ on the EU instead of cooperating (B6).
Others reject the Commission’s attempts to brand them as pro-active
‘stakeholders’, instead preferring the Commission to take the lead in promot-
ing sustainable development (B6). In turn, business representatives often avoid
open criticism of partner countries (B2), meaning they see themselves more as
lobbyists of their own interests (B9) instead of watchdogs.
Conclusions
The Domestic Advisory Groups established under EU trade agreements consti-
tute a major avenue for civil society consultation on sustainable development.
In this article, we examined how DAG members relate to the Commission’s
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way of governing these mechanisms, and what they do when the DAGs do
not satisfy their participation needs. In contrast to some previous studies
which deal with the limiting impact of EU governmentality on stakeholders,
the focus here is on stakeholders’ agency and their resistance. Our analysis
shows the magnitude of discontent with the Commission’s power over the
DAGs. Both business and non-business actors engage in the same types of
resistance, albeit to a different extent.
Building on an innovative conceptual framework that distinguishes six
types of resistance, we have shown that contrary to more structuralist accounts
which argue that the EU’s discourses do not leave much space for advocacy,
DAG members do engage in various subtle and outspoken forms of resistance.
We believe that this shows the relevance of studying resistance in all its forms,
including subtle ones, also in the case of relatively powerful actors operating
in a relatively highly institutionalized ‘partnership’ setting. Indeed, attention to
subtle resistance helps us not to mistake continued participation for cooptation.
While the mere fact of participating in the DAGs constitutes a basic acceptance
of the mechanisms, it does not mean that their members, including business
representatives, are fully satisfied with the underlying rationalities, technolo-
gies, or subjectivities. As the variety of forms of resistance show us, the EU’s
attempts to direct participation of the involved stakeholders on trade issues
have not entirely succeeded.
When it comes to comprehensiveness, resistance shown by civil society is
rather limited, agreeing to certain elements of power but retaining alternative
preferences; in particular, this concerns the DAGs’ very existence and function-
ing as cross-sectoral consensus-seeking bodies. These types of resistance are
less likely to change the status quo, but can surface in case of major upheavals.
For instance, the Dutch and French governments have published a proposal to
introduce sanctions for non-compliance with TSD chapters (The Netherlands
and France 2020). This would effectively strengthen the role of civil society.
Yet the majority of examples fall into the middle-range (rearticulation and
negotiation) or comprehensive (subversion and rejection) categories, showing a
substantial degree of discontent.
Much of this resistance has been productive in a Foucauldian sense, putting
forward alternative visions of how and why DAGs should be operating. A var-
iety of alternatives emerges from civil society. The Commission’s rationality
underlying the DAGs, namely, a present but weak link between trade and sus-
tainable development, is one of the main targets of resistance. Notably, busi-
ness organizations attempt to minimize the role of sustainability in
discussions, while non-business wants it substantially reinforced. This means
that the Commission occupies an in-between position in contrast with some
accounts that state it strongly sides with the business interests. Yet on a very
fundamental level, the Commission keeps within the trade liberalization para-
digm, as demonstrated by the much more active resistance shown by non-busi-
ness groups. Technology-wise, both business and non-business organizations
state they want stronger DAGs, although the latter are more outspoken and
demanding, and both subgroups’ goals differ. On a positive note, subjectivities
ascribed by the Commission to civil society are contested to a lesser extent.
This seems to bide well for the existence of consultation mechanisms, as these
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rely on the good will of DAG members and their continued willingness to
participate.
In general, the sheer number of examples of more comprehensive resistance
shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo is rather deep, and that civil
society is intent on bringing about changes. However, our analysis has also
demonstrated that resistance, like power, is never total. Even when a stake-
holder rejects or subverts some elements of power, this does not necessarily
extend to other aspects of the DAGs. The same civil society representative may
acquiesce to another element of power and rearticulate yet another to suit their
needs better. DAG members have nuanced, if often critical, opinions on the
mechanisms, and while we can observe some broad trends, there is no single
pattern of resisting.
This analysis also demonstrates why reforming the DAGs is not an easy
task: while the demand for reform is clear, it comes from opposing quarters.
With this in mind, the first step would be resolving the criticisms related to
technologies behind the DAGs, in particular, insufficient funding and publicity.
Since both business and non-business interests agree that the monitoring func-
tion of the DAGs should be enhanced, this would likely be uncontroversial
and might be a starting point for improvement of the DAGs. Future studies
may also wish to focus on the opinions of those organizations that are not
DAG members, either because they never joined or because they decided to
quit the mechanisms.
The conceptual framework elaborated upon in this article offers a nuanced,
multi-faceted perspective on resistance. It shows why we cannot expect that
disagreements among the DAG members and between the DAGs and the
Commission will be ‘ironed out’ with time. It also explains why DAG mem-
bers stay in the mechanisms despite widespread dissatisfaction with their func-
tioning, and demonstrates how resistance is used productively to (attempt to)
reshape the work of the DAGs. As such, we believe it can be used beyond this
particular empirical study, particularly to analyse other consultative bodies
established by the EU, national governments or other international bodies.
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